Henry Swift (anonymous) meinte am 19. Oct, 23:07:
Hmmm
There are actually two Nash equilibria, one in which P1 gives nothing to P2 and P2 accepts the split and one in which P1 gives nothing to P2 and P2 rejects the split. They are both subgame perfect.
Henry Swift (anonymous) antwortete am 19. Oct, 23:28:
Oh, and...
There are also uncountably infinite mixed equilibria that all include P1 giving nothing to P2 and P2 accepting with any real probability p and rejecting with probability 1-p. These are also subgame perfect.
Dr Ecksau (anonymous) antwortete am 20. Oct, 01:53:
Why should
{offer zero, reject offer} be a Nash equilibrium?
Henry Swift (anonymous) antwortete am 20. Oct, 12:07:
If P1 offers 0, then P2 can't improve the result from accepting. If P2 rejects, P1 can't improve the result from offering more than 0.
