Tony Candido (anonymous) meinte am 20. Oct, 06:26:
I'll bite
1. Infinite Nash equilibria between x=epsilon and x=1 (at x=0 P2 has no incentive to accept).2. One of them is subgame perfect: x=epsilon. That is the rational maximizing strategy for P1, assuming P2 is rational, and P2 knows it.
Henry Swift (anonymous) antwortete am 20. Oct, 12:13:
At x=0 P2 has no incentive to accept, but that's not the definition of a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies such that neither player can do better given the other player's strategy. If P1 offers 0, P2 can't do better than accepting (or rejecting, for that matter.) And x=epsilon can't be part of a Nash equilibria since it is always better for P1 to offer x=epsilon/2.
