Taleb is a former broker, wrote a quasi-textbook on options and market making, and then got more philosophical in his best seller Fooled by Randomness. He considers his current occupation as an “essayist & epistemologist of randomness”. His thesis is that improbable yet important events are under anticipated. True enough. Specifics are always unexpected, like when 21-42-53-26-11 wins the lottery. But Taleb suggest in his new book The Black Swan a more meaningful hypothesis, that economically important things are consistently unexpected, in that people underestimate, on average, the probability and impact of improbable events (e.g., Black Swans).
From Taleb's Wikipedia entry circa July 2006, we see where this Black Swan thinking goes when applied to an investment strategy:
These assertions present some straightforward tests. Specifically, buying out-of-the-money options, especially puts (because of negative skew), should make money on average. But insurance companies, which basically are selling out-of-the-money options, tend to do well as any industry (Warren Buffet has always favored insurance companies, especially re-insurers, as equity investments). Studies by Shumway and Coval (2001) and Bondarenko (2003) have documented that selling puts is where all the extranormal profit seems to be. So of all the option strategies, selling, not buying, out-of-the-money puts has been the best performer historically. Oh well, just a sign error!
Martin Gardner wrote a popular column for Scientific American, and in the process received a lot of mail from ‘cranks’ telling him about perpetual motion machines and the like. So he wrote a book called Fads and Fallacies. In the book he describes "cranks" who he describes as having five invariable characteristics:
The Black Swan argues that standard statistics is flawed because it is backward looking—I too prefer statistics on future data—and argues that standard measures of risk like the normal distribution are a ‘fraud’. All models or theories are simplifications of a more complex reality, parochial and incomplete; they don't work in all circumstances, and are irrelevant at certain levels of aggregation or for certain applications. That doesn't mean they are fraudulent. Taleb makes perfection the enemy of the good, and winds himself into knots of contradictions, such as calling himself an empiricist yet relying mainly on anecdotes, or having extreme confidence in other's overconfidence. He states he teaches how to take advantage of uncertainty, but skewering traditional forecasting tools leads him merely to nihilism, or simply overestimating the probability of improbable events (see put studies, above). How would one draw the line on which unseen data should be ignored (it's a large set, after all)? He argues we reward those who imagine the impossible, but what does that mean in practice, that we encourage people to enumerate everything possible no matter how improbable? Such risk reports are all too common because they reflect a lot of work, but without some sort of prioritization they are useless. One can remember Richard Clarke’s vague warning about Al Qaeda (and cyberterrorism, and ...) prior to 9/11, or the hundreds of ‘mission critical risk’ overrides on the Challenger space shuttle before it blew up, as examples of beautiful hindsight but useless foresight.
I could imagine him teaching a statistics class to freshman and instead of starting with the arithmetic mean and standard deviation ask 'what was the probability of an airplane taking down the World Trade Center on September 10, 2001?', and waxing poetic about how ‘we just don’t know!” Students might think such talk is much cooler than boring formulas, but such confused thinking leads nowhere in particular and can be indulged indefinitely without producing anything useful, as Taleb demonstrates over 400 pages.
From Taleb's Wikipedia entry circa July 2006, we see where this Black Swan thinking goes when applied to an investment strategy:
When he was primarily a trader, he developed an investment method which sought to profit from unusual and unpredictable random events, which he called "black swans". His reasoning was that traders lose much more money from a market crash than they gain from even years of steady gains; and so he did not worry if his portfolio lost money steadily, as long as that portfolio positioned him to profit greatly from an extremely large deviation (either a crash or an unexpected jump upwards).Taleb recently co-authored a paper arguing that most people severely underestimate volatility. Furthermore, he argues there exists not only an unappreciation of fat tails, but a preference for positive skew, in that people prefer assets that jump up, not down, which would imply the superiority of buying out-of-the-money puts as opposed to calls because those negative tails that increase the price of puts are unappreciated.
These assertions present some straightforward tests. Specifically, buying out-of-the-money options, especially puts (because of negative skew), should make money on average. But insurance companies, which basically are selling out-of-the-money options, tend to do well as any industry (Warren Buffet has always favored insurance companies, especially re-insurers, as equity investments). Studies by Shumway and Coval (2001) and Bondarenko (2003) have documented that selling puts is where all the extranormal profit seems to be. So of all the option strategies, selling, not buying, out-of-the-money puts has been the best performer historically. Oh well, just a sign error!
Martin Gardner wrote a popular column for Scientific American, and in the process received a lot of mail from ‘cranks’ telling him about perpetual motion machines and the like. So he wrote a book called Fads and Fallacies. In the book he describes "cranks" who he describes as having five invariable characteristics:
- A profound intellectual superiority complex.
- Regards other researchers as idiotic, and always operates outside the peer review system.
- Believes there is a campaign against their ideas, a campaign compared with the persecution of Galileo or Pasteur.
- Attacks only the biggest theories and scientific figures.
- Coins neologisms.
The Black Swan argues that standard statistics is flawed because it is backward looking—I too prefer statistics on future data—and argues that standard measures of risk like the normal distribution are a ‘fraud’. All models or theories are simplifications of a more complex reality, parochial and incomplete; they don't work in all circumstances, and are irrelevant at certain levels of aggregation or for certain applications. That doesn't mean they are fraudulent. Taleb makes perfection the enemy of the good, and winds himself into knots of contradictions, such as calling himself an empiricist yet relying mainly on anecdotes, or having extreme confidence in other's overconfidence. He states he teaches how to take advantage of uncertainty, but skewering traditional forecasting tools leads him merely to nihilism, or simply overestimating the probability of improbable events (see put studies, above). How would one draw the line on which unseen data should be ignored (it's a large set, after all)? He argues we reward those who imagine the impossible, but what does that mean in practice, that we encourage people to enumerate everything possible no matter how improbable? Such risk reports are all too common because they reflect a lot of work, but without some sort of prioritization they are useless. One can remember Richard Clarke’s vague warning about Al Qaeda (and cyberterrorism, and ...) prior to 9/11, or the hundreds of ‘mission critical risk’ overrides on the Challenger space shuttle before it blew up, as examples of beautiful hindsight but useless foresight.
I could imagine him teaching a statistics class to freshman and instead of starting with the arithmetic mean and standard deviation ask 'what was the probability of an airplane taking down the World Trade Center on September 10, 2001?', and waxing poetic about how ‘we just don’t know!” Students might think such talk is much cooler than boring formulas, but such confused thinking leads nowhere in particular and can be indulged indefinitely without producing anything useful, as Taleb demonstrates over 400 pages.
HedgeFundGuy - am 2007-04-20 03:35
a.t. (anonymous) meinte am 20. Apr, 12:00:
mistakes
This is wrong. Nassim told me that he says that tails are not priceable.But there is somethig strange here. Nassim has full academic posititon, tenure offer from a prominent university, and 10 refereed publications in the last 2 years with revisions in Science, Complexity. How many did HedgeGuy publish? More critically how many of those did GARDNER publish?
TDL (anonymous) meinte am 20. Apr, 20:30:
I personally liked the first book (have yet to read "Black Swans".) Do you think that there is no value in what Taleb is doing?Regards,
TDL
HedgeFundGuy antwortete am 21. Apr, 00:12:
I think there's an audience for his style, which many find entertaining, because it mixes meanness and erudition in a novel way. But I don't think there are any insights you can use, just criticisms of straw men without any concrete alternatives.
Luke Lea (anonymous) meinte am 21. Apr, 02:21:
landscape gardener (retired)
I have a similar reaction to Taleb. He sounded interesting, so I bought his book, but half way through realized he was writing about nothing. His main point is well taken, but he only has one point to make, or so it seems to me.Still, when I think about the Long Term Capital fiasco, I cannot help but think those guys were, indeed, fooled by randomness. They had modeled everything but the unexpected -- which eventually, of course, happened.
a. (anonymous) antwortete am 21. Apr, 20:38:
why not ethnic
why didn't you turn ethnic this time with Taleban references?
HedgeFundGuy antwortete am 22. Apr, 00:30:
I will go on the record and state I am still against the Taleban
J (anonymous) meinte am 22. Apr, 03:43:
I've read the book. and it seems the reviewer has not read the book, and did little to get past the website and his own apparent hangups. Then again, coming from someone who used ethnic insinuations and cheap shots such as "Taleban" in previous posts, it has all the authority of a Don Imus...
Meh (anonymous) antwortete am 22. Apr, 07:20:
J,Agree or disagree with HedgeFundGuy's tone, he did post substantive (and good) reasons for not liking the book. I think it would be better if you posted substantive reasons on why you disagree with HedgeFundGuy's analysis. Otherwise you simply support the comic "taleban" reference, i.e. mindless followers who refuse to honestly and substantively address Taleb's critics.
The more technical the discussion the better. The readers are not lightweights.
J (anonymous) antwortete am 22. Apr, 16:34:
My contention is simple; the larger part of the review is devoted to the website, and the author's opinion of other works by Taleb. In comparison, the book gets scant attention. This is suspicious at best, especially in the context of previous ethnic slurs by the same author.
HedgeFundGuy antwortete am 23. Apr, 01:48:
The books theses were addressed (significance of low-frequency events, failure of statistics). As per your ability to infer calling his supporters the "Taleban" an ethnic slur, I find that a strained attempt to generate righteous indignation.
John S. (anonymous) meinte am 22. Apr, 14:42:
I read Fooled by Randomness and had a similar impression: one small idea padded out to book length by a man convinced of his own genius. He did not convince me. I won't waste my time reading The Black Swan.
PMcK (anonymous) meinte am 23. Apr, 14:20:
You haven't read the book.
Dynamic Hedging (quasi-textbook) is simply one of the greatest trading/markets books ever written. How much real world trading experience do actually have? It is laced with crucial doses of scepticism toward academic finance and offers patches and work-arounds for the practitioner confronted with a messy uncertain reality (a traders survival kit). I don't believe you have read the Black Swan or at least understood the work when you make statements such as: "Specifics are always unexpected, like when 21-42-53-26-11 wins the lottery." One of Talebs' stands is against the use of casino/roulette/game statistics in finance and economics - the mild type where the generator reveals its properties as the sample size increases!
Again your point about insurance companies is covered. House fires, stolen cars etc are all normally distributed. This is NOT the wild randomness Taleb is speaking of it is mild, like your lottery example. The generator is stable the tails have a negligible impact on the mean.
Just read the book BEFORE you make comments because you are annoyed he doesn't like economists (particularly investment banking marketing type economists).
Marcus (anonymous) meinte am 25. Apr, 14:43:
I haven't read the 'Black Swan' yet, and to be honest I might never do - although I liked 'Fooled by Randomness'. As far as I can tell it seems to be the same idea, but with new examples - and I fear more theories...I liked your review, HedgeFundGuy, and I have to admit that a similar review could also have been written on 'Fooled by Randomness'. However, I would like to make a point about how books like this should be read. (I noted a similar phenomenon when reading e.g. Soro's 'Alchemy of Finance'.)
One should take into consideration the fact that Taleb is not really a trained academic, which, I believe, results in the problems you mention. To get something out of the book, I don't think it should be read as an attempt to creat new theory - although Taleb thinks that's what he is doing. Instead I think it should be read more like a work of fiction. But as such it can be instructive, at least 'Fooled by Randomness' was to me.
Thus, the worth of 'Fooled by Randomness' was in the intuition - in the true meaning of the word - not in the science. As far as I'm concerned you could certainly bash him even harder - so he stops doing science and does more fiction, which he is (or was) good at.
Anonymous (anonymous) meinte am 26. Apr, 21:26:
Well done
Excellent summary. I agree completely with your review. Taleb is just like an insurance salesman peddling his wares. In this case Taleb's compensation comes in the form of books sold and a pseudo-celebrity status. Regarding the "Taleban," I think you should add a 6th point to your crank checklist: 6. Has a huge and dedicated following of "believers."
EDS (anonymous) meinte am 27. Apr, 23:32:
Taleb hits it right on the mark...again.
Having read both Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan, as well as every other noteworthy book closely related to this area, not just as it's applied to finance, I completely disagree with the review of the book and Taleb.No disrespect to the reference to Martin Gardner, who is basically completely unknown as compared to Taleb in terms of readership, (FBR is required reading in many schools and at many firms worldwide and The Black Swan is already a bestseller), but his model for deciding "cranks" is vastly overstated, and, in fact, would probably be capriciously applied against other brilliant thinkers and innovators, who are not authors or who don't have a history in the financial services world, should it fit the reviewer's agenda. Also, #5 absolutely cracks me up. If people weren't creating neologisms on a regular basis, our language would hardly evolve. There's no flaw in Taleb for offering his own. The populace is who decides whether something becomes integrated.
Yes Taleb refutes the work of others--even others who are heavily credentialed--but at the end of the day he makes good points. People are excellent at analzying data in reverse to fit their theories or to help explain situations, especially the unpredictable. But truly, at the end of the day, we know very little about the highly improbable. Having recently seen him speak in person, he himself said the same for himself, so it's not as if he is claiming any kind of elaborate or advanced knowledge of how to predict Black Swans, which would weaken his point.
Overall, I wonder whether the reviewer has even read the book, or is not instead merely "nexting" what he expects Taleb to say (even if Taleb is writing something totally different), based on the biases of his own experiences.
HedgeFundGuy antwortete am 28. Apr, 00:32:
I just don't get it
So, if he's not saying anything general and testable, like that improbable events are consistently underexpected, but rather that specific events are unexpected...who cares?...that's trivially true for gaussian randomness or any other type (who knew Kevin Federline would be a more responsible parent than Britney Spears?). So he is saying that people can't anticipate unexpected things. Who knew! And he is courageous and farsighted enough to admit he also cannot anticipate unexpected things. Perhaps he needs a neologism for 'unexpected' so that this insight seems interesting. That people have a desire to apply a narrative to data seems obvious, we are drawn to theory, because it helps us understand the world better; the alternative is seeing things as a bunch of random events. The bottom line is that when you try to pin him down as generating an interesting scientific hypothesis, he retreats. He's the charlatan, the arrogant expert, the broker fooled by his customer flow (as opposed to randomness), the thin-skinned psuedo-scientist ..just claiming he's a seer of some vague deep truth that the 'idiots' don't see.
I find him very interesting because 1) he is thin-skinned 2) he is pompous 3) he is popular 4) he has similar interests to mine. Ravi Batra sold more books than Taleb, and was perhaps more profound. I like picking him apart because he is such an easy target, so I wish for his continued success.
EDS (anonymous) antwortete am 28. Apr, 01:46:
You get some of it
People cannot predict unexpected events. Yes that seems absurdly simple. But in reality we don't live it. That's what makes Taleb's book so interesting. We place a lot of value on our ability to quantify the rare event and just as dangerously we explain away our situations by using past data when we get it all wrong. I should point out that other successful books like The Wisdom of Crowds present arguments that are also plainly obvious, yet they turn into international bestsellers because of one reason "The plainly obvious gets overlooked." K & T in all of their studies present things that are fairly simplistic from a behavioral standpoint, but it takes the written word to cement them in our minds.I'm just not sure what you want Taleb to present to you in The Black Swan. You think him a charlatan. It would be far worse if we made more of the "uncertain" than he does...I don't think one person or one book could do more.
In terms of publishing success (without discussing my role in the industry, I can say that I know a great deal firsthand). Ravi Batra, whom you referenced, has had some successful books. The fact that he has outsold Taleb to this point is based simply on volume of books written and also that The Black Swan has been out barely a week.
HedgeFundGuy antwortete am 28. Apr, 02:34:
I agree that a simple or obvious idea can be a very good read, I just disagreed the profundity of the point(s) in this book. Unexpected things are unexpected? People are overconfident? People try to categorize things? People try to explain events via a story? I don't think these ideas are surprising, so their exposition not interesting. In contrast, in the Wisdom of Crowds, it's not obvious the crowd average opinion is a good opinion, one might intuitively think it is average, in fact.
TalebGuy (anonymous) meinte am 28. Apr, 00:24:
Reviewer is mistaken
If insurance companies are the great business claimed by the reviewer to contradict Taleb, then why did reinsurance companies lose money on their underwriting activities for 19 of the last 20 years!? The reviewer is obviously out of contact with reality.Moreover, a Katrina sized risk is now pretty close to falling into the realm of normally distributed risks, estimated by some insurers as having a probability of ~3% a year. A truly long tail risk today would be on the order of $100B, a triple Katrina, and it can be easily contemplated, had Katrina or another Category 5 storm chosen Miami or other more heavily developed area than NOLA to make landfall. The point being: having already mispriced their exposure by "selling puts" too cheaply, it can be fairly argued that insurance companies still got lucky that their losses weren't even higher.
Having LOST A LOT OF MONEY on underwriting, insurance companies only managed to climb back into the land of respectable returns thanks to their investment returns which are surely NOT sourced in a material way from selling puts or otherwise trying to collar the wildness that Taleb writes about.
a.t. (anonymous) antwortete am 29. Apr, 02:57:
Gardner is a Journalist
Nassim is full professor Umass mathematics fellow at NYU Courant, moving to Wharton or LBS. Very prestigious. Gardner is a journalist. Hedgeguy is a blogger. Something in these posts is weird.
HedgeFundGuy antwortete am 29. Apr, 03:50:
Nassim is no longer a professor at Amherst, and adjunct professor at NYU is not the same as professor. But this is all ad hominem, and irrelevant to my factual counters to his hypotheses.
a.t. (anonymous) antwortete am 29. Apr, 13:26:
Bitter Envy
"But this is all ad hominem, and irrelevant" who are you trying to fool? You do not want to be ad hominem? And you go after Taleb's ethnicity! You are trying everything you can You are a crackpot some bitter unsuccessful fellow bitter bitter envious of Taleb, full of hatred.
PM (anonymous) antwortete am 29. Apr, 15:23:
HedgeFundGuy is a crank
He hasn't read to book.
MrM (anonymous) antwortete am 29. Apr, 20:22:
Density vs Volume of good thoughs
Black Swan have some valuable and useful insights. Unfortunately, instead of writing a nice essay, Taleb (who calls himself an essayist), chose to spread those insights into hundreds of pages. As a result, instead of leaving the impression "Wow, I should be more aware of those biases", Black Swan mostly causes the annoying feeling of "Alright, alright, I got it 150 pages ago - tell me something new now!"
HedgeFundGuy antwortete am 29. Apr, 20:41:
a.t.: Who brought up credentials first? I merely pointed out an exaggeration. Is not the Black Swan harshly critical of people and ideas? So my criticism of him and his ideas are evidence of being a 'player hater'? The lame attempt to tar me as an ethnic chauvinist?Taleb's acolytes are just like him, hypocritical and thin-skinned.
Kevembuangga (anonymous) antwortete am 2. May, 14:25:
May be a little PERSONAL thinking could help...
The commonness of 40-SD eventsPlus Taleb related links from the comments of above :
We can see the causes of Cho's rampage now, so why not before?
Shattering the Bell Curve
meeneah (anonymous) meinte am 9. May, 10:31:
Black humor
Nassim Taleb is a joke. The "research" for the the paper you cite, and which any good undergrad would be ashamed to turn in, consisted in asking a bunch of quant finance professionals and grad students to answer the following question:A stock (or a fund) has an average return of 0%. It moves on average 1% a day in absolute value; the average up move is 1% and the average down move is 1%. It does not mean that all up moves are 1%--some are .6%, others 1.45%, etc. Assume that we live in the Gaussian world in which the returns (or daily percentage moves) can be safely modeled using a Normal Distribution. Assume that a year has 256 business days. The following questions concern the standard deviation of returns (i.e., of the percentage moves), the “sigma” that is used for volatility in financial applications.
What is the daily sigma? What is the yearly sigma?
Unsurprisingly, most people go with 1% for the daily sigma, when the actual answer is 1.25%. Hence, taleb reasons, people equate mean absolute deviation and standard deviation, and since for some random variables ("a vector of dimension 10^6, composed of 999,999 elements of 0 and one of 10^6", aka a Bernoulli) the difference is dramatic.
As an aside: Taleb notes that a lot of them declined to respond, and that "one might expect this sort of self-selection to improve accuracy". Given the fact that good people tend to be too busy to indulge in these kinds of game, and that mathematically oriented people too rigorous not too be put off by expressions like "living in a Gaussian world" (if only we did...), I would actually expect the self-selection to increase accuracy. But I digress.
The point is that the introduction of the concept of mean absolute deviation, which is rarely used and whose value is in practice, for non-pathological cases, close to the much more commonly used standard deviation was bound to lead the respondents into error. Asking the annual volatility only makes things worse (a "trap", in student-speak): a lot of the students probably saw this as a typical "annualize the daily volatility" question.
Mathematical chicaneries like these have absolutely (excuse the pun) no relevance in a trading floor, as Taleb well knows. No one is going to use a normal distribution table to find out the probability of google moving more than 3sd's any given day; "standard deviation" is, by and large, simply used as a proxy for volatility (in the layman's sense of the word).
The irony of all this is that just as Taleb started making his let's buy OTM options theory, finance markets entered a stage of unprecedented low volatility, and no matter how loud the bard sang, his black swan refused to make his entrance, causing the philosopher trader to return his gullible investors' money and embark on a journey of cafe hopping and museum visiting" (no soul-seeking for us). I hear that after trying his hand at the trading floor and the lecture hall, Taleb is schedule to appear on Comedy Central (was it today?). This time, it seems, he has found his calling.
Noah (anonymous) meinte am 9. May, 11:46:
Could Taleb please stop commenting anonymously?
It's a tad pathetic praising yourself. If you get constructive criticism, use it to your advantage and improve yourself.
StopWhining (anonymous) meinte am 31. Jul, 19:04:
Just so you know...
Taleb's book is the "user-friendly" summary of Mandelbrot's work. I almost guarantee you haven't read his book "The (Mis)behavior of Markets," but I highly doubt that you would have gone through such effort to bash Mandelbrot as you have Taleb. He does not necessarily argue that statistics are backward-looking, but that the world does not follow a Normal Bell Curve. And sure a model is a less complex representation, but it IS fraudulent if the model claims to actually represent what it does not--in this case risk. (The models claim to capture risk but they are based on the normal curve instead of one with fatter tails). I mean, I could tell you that once a month every human goes through the menstrual cycle based on the model of female anatomy... I mean men and women are close enough right?
The bottom line is that the world is not "Normal." In a "Black Swan" world such as ours, statistical series do have memories, large deviations that would almost never occur in billions of years (according to the bell curve) happen all of the time, and Mandelbrot and Taleb both want to point that out and possibly provide an alternative.
The problem is that with a Black Swan world, there is no simple solution like standard deviation to characterize risk (unless its discovery is a black swan in itself) and that is why you cry "HERESY" and call Taleb a charlatan and a fraud.
As for Taleb's book, I found it quite repetitive and plagued with anecdotes, but the information he presents is interesting and valid, especially about the way people think and process information. Your review barely discusses this, despite that he spends a significant portion of the book discussing epistemilogical problems. I'd like to see you find a problem with that section of his book, if you've actually read it. I'm not quite sure I believe that you have.